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METING OUT MISFORTUNE: HOW THE COURTS
ARE ALLOTTING THE COSTS OF MARITIME
INJURY IN THE EIGHTIES
Graydon S. Staring*
INTRODUCTION
No other division of the maritime law has seen such striking changes
in the last thirty years as the doctrines by which it transfers the losses
for maritime injuries from those upon whom they first fall. No discussion
of current doctrines and trends can be viewed in isolation from three
decades of rapid development, nor from many decades of previous
doctrinal development. But this article will describe all of this only
briefly, as a great deal has been published about it already.
While there are many other good sources, I refer you to my own
article published in 19571 for the historical background of contribution
and for the evidence that it should properly occupy a prominent place
in the law of maritime injury despite the then generally held view that
it was unavailable, and to a recent article by an excellent scholar of
the subject, Francis J. Gorman,2 leading us up to the beginning of this
decade in the development of indemnity and contribution.
Rather than referring to all of the trial court cases which support
a position or suggest another one, I will look at the evidence of decisions
in the United States Supreme Court and the United States Courts of
Appeals, referring to district court cases only when they are needed to
fill a gap or because they seem especially significant.
BACKGROUND-CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY BEFORE THE FIFTIES
A brief review of nineteenth century developments is necessary at
this point. Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the doctrine of
contribution was recognized in collision cases and other vessel casualties
but was restricted to the Moiety Rule, which is to say that it dictated
only equal division of damages between the tortfeasors. Contribution
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Member, California Bar.
1. Staring, Contribution and Division of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases,
45 Calif. L. Rev. 304 (1957).
2. Gorman, Indemnity and Contribution under Maritime Law, 55 Tul. L. Rev. 1165
(1981).
3. Staring, supra note 1, at 310-16.
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was available by crosspleading when the several tortfeasors were present
in the same action" and, at least by the beginning of the twentieth
century, it was available by a separate action to recover after payment
of the judgment by one of the tortfeasers.1 The doctrinal foundation
of contribution was not exotic; it was grounded firmly upon the direct
liability of the contributor in tort and the principle that he should
respond for his own derelictions, whether or not he was sued in the
first instance. 6 Well before the end of the century, contribution had
spread from collision to personal injury cases where the collision doctrine
was the basis for reducing rather than barring recoveries of injured
longshoremen and other plaintiffs in cases of vessel negligence. In that
context, apportionments finer than the Moiety Rule began to occur
although the Moiety Rule itself persisted firmly outside of injury and
death claims, the relationship of the two applications being judicially
forgotten. 7
In retrospect, one can see a trend developing through the nineteenth
century and early part of the twentieth century toward the development
of contribution and apportionment by degree of fault as pervasive doc-
trines in the maritime law, absent some accidental interruption. As we
continue, however, we can see that an interruption occurred, and I think
we can identify the accident.
In the first five decades of the twentieth century things moved slowly,
although important developments occurred. At the outset, the right of
seamen to recover for injuries caused by unseaworthiness was an-
nounced.8 In 1920 the Jones Act9 was passed, by which seamen acquired
the right to recover for the negligence of their employers, and the doctrine
of apportionment according to fault was established by statute for such
recoveries.1° It was judicially settled also that the doctrine of comparative
fault applied to seamen's recoveries for unseaworthiness.'1
In 1927 the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act (LHWCA or Act) was passed, which declared the employers of
these workers shielded from damage suits by their injured employees
but gave both employee and employer an interest in damage suits which
might be brought against third parties, usually vessels and their owners.'2
In the remainder of the 20's and 30's the Act appeared to work well
4. Id. at 335.
5. Id. at 335.
6. Id. at 334.
7. Id. at 321-24.
8. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 23 S. Ct. 483 (1903).
9. Codified at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1983).
10. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1983) (incorporated by reference).
11. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 59 S. Ct. 262 (1939).
12. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1983).
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without resulting in an extraordinary amount of third-party litigation.
This was no doubt due to the benefits being reasonably scaled to the
economy of that period and the fact that injury damage judgments were
far more conservative than they later became, while employers, then as
now, were usually disinclined to bring suits against their shipowner
customers as an alternative to passing their premiums along as elements
of their service rates.
THE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES
A decline in the adequacy of compensation payments produced
greater pressure for damage recoveries and in 1946 in the Sieracki case 3
the Supreme Court was persuaded to hold that longshoremen were
entitled to the same warranty of seaworthiness as seamen on the basis
that they were doing traditional seamen's work. The same rule would
later be applied indiscriminately to other harborworkers. The multipli-
cation of damage suits against shipowners, resulting in many instances
from the negligence of stevedores and longshoremen themselves, brought
pressure to find a way to recover back again from the contractor
employer.
The Supreme Court had decided 14 that an express indemnity agree-
ment in favor of the shipowner in a stevedore contract was valid and
enforceable, but there were many stevedore contracts which did not
contain such an agreement.
Resort was had to what was then taken to be the well-established
admiralty rule of contribution. But in the Halcyon case 5 the Supreme
Court denied the possibility of recovering over from a negligent stevedore
for even the modest contribution of the amount of its liability in
compensation and medical payments. The Court was right, of course,
because the employer could not have been held directly liable in a tort
suit for damages and thus a fundamental requirement of admiralty
contribution was missing. The Court made a quite unnecessary and
extravagantly erroneous statement that its own decisions had established
no basis for the application of the maritime doctrine of contribution in
other than collision cases, and until the Seventies the lower courts con-
sidered themselves bound to restrict contribution accordingly. 6
In the same period some shipowners were seeking not just contri-
bution, but indemnity' 7 in reliance on respectable old tort cases based
13. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872 (1946).
14. American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 67 S. Ct. 847 (1947).
15. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.
Ct. 277 (1952).
16. Staring, supra note 1, at 304-05.
17. Compare Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134 (2nd Cir. 1951) with States S.S.
Co. v. Rothschild Intl. Stevedoring Co., 205 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1953).
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upon the distinctions between primary and secondary liability, or active
and passive negligence.' 8 This approach was ultimately doomed for the
same reason as contribution in Halcyon and was eventually put down
by the Supreme Court in cases where it was no longer needed anyway.19
With the Ryan case,20 the shipowner succeeded in its quest for
indemnity. The Supreme Court perhaps recognized, for there was old
authority, that the stevedore's contract (as any contract for expert service)
involved an implied obligation (which the Court called a warranty) of
safe, proper and workmanlike performance (hereafter, the "warranty of
workmanlike performance"), the breach of which would normally give
rise to an action for damages. The obstacle to recovery in Halcyon did
not apply here because Halcyon depended upon tort and Ryan upon
contract, and a party enjoying immunity by law for tort liability could
nevertheless contract to be liable for the same occurrence. It was probably
thought by some that the Ryan court had regretted Halcyon, but since
Ryan the Court has thrice reaffirmed Halcyon and clearly distinguished
the two cases. 2'
The warranty of workmanlike performance which the Court em-
braced in Ryan had originated in the context of negligence when un-
seaworthiness was undreamed of22 and, although the Ryan case had
involved unseaworthiness, the Supreme Court soon made it clear that
the Ryan indemnity was equally available when the shipowner had been
initially held for negligence. 21 In the same case, the Supreme Court
decided that while mere contributory negligence on the shipowner's part
was not a defense to a claim for indemnity, the shipowner's action in
hindering or interfering with the stevedores' operation might constitute
"conduct . . . sufficient to preclude recovery." ' 24 Also, in the years
soon after the Ryan decision, its application was extended to charterers,
owners and consignees who had not contracted with the employer but
18. E.g., Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316, 16 S. Ct.
564 (1896).
19. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 78 S. Ct. 438
(1958).
20. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S. Ct. 232
(1956).
21. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S. Ct. 202 (1953); Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 406 U.S. 340, 92 S. Ct. 1550 (1972); Edmonds v.
Campagnie Generale Trans-Atlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 99 S. Ct. 2753 (1979).
22. The court relied on earlier decisions such as Mowbray v. Merryweather, [1895]
2 Q.B. 640, and Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. Joseph Gutradt Co., 10 F.2d 769 (9th
Cir. 1926).
23. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 355 U.S. 563, 78 S. Ct. at 438 (1958).
24. Id. at 567, 78 S. Ct. at 441.
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were sufficiently related to the vessel to be viewed as interests for whose
benefit the warranty existed.2 5
One more development will bring us to the threshold of the Seventies.
The LHWCA provides for a statutory assignment of the longshoreman's
third-party damage claim to his employer if he has not brought suit on
it within six months after an award of compensation. The Act also
provides for the distribution of the recovery between the employer and
the employee, whichever brings the suit. 26 It was natural to suppose,
therefore, that Congress had occupied the field and expressed the con-
ditions under which the longshoreman's employer might sue the vessel
on account of the longshoremen's injury.
But in the Burnside case27 in 1969 the Supreme Court held otherwise.
The underlying problem was that the longshoreman had been killed and
the recovery against the shipowner for his death then depended upon
a state wrongful death act with a limit on damages, whereas the employer
had already incurred a compensation liability far beyond that limit and
clearly could not make its recovery through its lien on the suit of the
longshoreman's survivors. The Court held that it had been error to
dismiss the stevedore's complaint; in other words, it could not be said
at the pleading stage that the shipowner was incapable of having com-
mitted a tort against the employer for which it would have to pay
damages and the matter was not controlled by the provisions of the
LHWCA. Questions of contribution, that is the effect of contributory
negligence, and of possible defenses were not reached.
MAJOR EVENTS OF THE SEVENTIES
Four major events of the Seventies continued the rapid change
shaping our present trends. The first of these was the 1972 Amendment
of the LHWCA and, in particular, the amendment of section 5. A new
subsection was added 28 that limited the longshoremen's and harbor work-
ers' recoveries against vessels to the ground of negligence, thereby nul-
lifying the Sieracki decision and abolishing the right of a vessel, either
by express or implied agreement, to recover indemnity or contribution
from the employer. The vessel was defined in the Act to include her
owners, charterers, agents and crew. 29
25. E.g., Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 79 S. Ct. 445 (1959); Waterman
S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421, 81 S. Ct. 200 (1960).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1983).
27. Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404, 89 S.
Ct. 1144 (1969).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1983).
29. Id. § 902(21).
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The pattern of indemnity suits as we had known it since Ryan was
at an end. But was all indemnity, whether by tort, contract or restitution,
precluded? Did the warranty of workmanlike performance perish or only
the consequent damages in a specific class of cases? And was the newly
stated negligence liability of the vessel limited only by reduction for the
contributory negligence of the injured worker or was it further limited
to the vessel's percentage of all the fault involved, including that of
the stevedore, who would respond only by compensation benefits under
the Act, but through its lien could make an indirect recovery from the
vessel for the consequences of its own major fault? These questions
remained to be answered.
The lower courts had begun seriously questioning the overstatement
of the Supreme Court about contribution in the Halcyon case and
advanced the view that the case could be reconstrued and limited to its
circumstances so that contribution might be allowed in injury cases when
the contributor was not immune to a damage suit, as it was in Halcyon.30
In the Cooper Stevedoring case3 the Supreme Court fully vindicated
this view, restricting the Halcyon holding to cases of statutory immunity.
It was striking that the case itself allowed contribution against a steve-
dore. The longshoreman had been injured while discharging cargo, and
the vessel owner sued the loading stevedore for indemnity or contribution.
Indemnity was barred by the conduct of the shipowner, but with Halcyon
restricted to its proper scope, it was no bar to contribution since the
contributing stevedore was not the employer of the injured longshoreman
and thus had no statutory immunity with respect to his case and could
have been sued by him directly.
As the Cooper Stevedoring case had arisen before the 1972 Amend-
ments, it was not affected by them but in any event it is difficult to
see anything in those Amendments indicating a desire to protect someone
other than the employer simply because he happens to be engaged in
the same business and be governed by the same Act as the employer.
In 1975 in the Reliable Transfer case,32 the Supreme Court brought
the Moiety Rule to an end and adopted proportional damages for
collisions and obviously also for analogous vessel casualties since strand-
ing, rather than collision, was actually involved. Although in decreeing
apportionment for collisions and similar casualties the Court did not
generalize on maritime contribution, the terms in which it embraced the
30. See Horton & Horton, Inc. v. T/S J.E. Dyer, 428 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1970);
Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970).
31. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 94 S. Ct. 2174
(1974).
32. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975).
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apportionment rule leave the reader with little doubt that the rule must
apply in all cases of maritime contribution.
What happened next is better described as a non-event, in that it
changed nothing though it did so emphatically. In the Edmonds" case,
decided by the Supreme Court in 1979, in which certiorari had been
sought by both parties to resolve the issue for the country, the Supreme
Court was asked to hold that the true meaning of the 1972 Amendment
to section 5 of the LHWCA was to hold the shipowner only for his
own negligence in the special sense that he should be liable only for
that portion of the damages proportional to his share of all the negligence
involved, including that of the stevedore-employer, where the stevedore
had been found 80 percent at fault-10 percent through the injured man
himself, and 70 percent through other employees. This interpretation, if
adopted, would have left the stevedore, when he was largely at fault, to
bear the major burden himself through compensation by reducing the
damage judgment and requiring the stevedore to give appropriate credit
on his lien recovery. The Court rejected this position and held the vessel's
damages reducible only by the injured man's proportion of fault.
With this background in mind, we are now ready to examine where
we are and where we are going in the Eighties.
CURRENT PATTERNS AND TRENDS
The State of the Warranty of Workmanlike Performance
Some viewed the Ryan warranty of workmanlike performance as a
creature of the warranty of seaworthiness which depended upon the
latter for its continued existence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
expressed this view in a case decided shortly after the 1972 Amendments
but which was not dependent upon them.14 The question presented was
whether one contractor to a vessel should have the benefit of the warranty
from another contractor with the same vessel. The court held that it
should not and, as one ground of the holding, denied that the warranty
of workmanlike performance ran to anyone who was not held for a
breach of the warranty of seaworthiness, saying:
The rationale underlying Ryan and the later cases is that when
a shipowner owes a duty of seaworthiness to an injured party
(and consequently its liability is not dependent on a finding of
its fault) a corresponding duty of indemnity should devolve upon
a stevedore whose failure to perform with reasonable safely
caused the injury .... The circumstance which gives rise to
33. Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 256, 99 S. Ct. at 2753.
34. Davis v. Chas. Kurz & Co., 483 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1973).
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the implied warranty is the duty of seaworthiness owed by the
party seeking indemnification .... That circumstance is not pres-
ent here."
In taking this position the court ignored the rationale of the Supreme
Court in Ryan that it was not inventing a duty but only holding that
its enforcement was not forbidden by the Act. It also ignored the
Supreme Court's explicit application of the warranty to pure negligence
cases.16 If the Ninth Circuit were right, then the warranty no longer
existed after 1972, at least in cases to which the Act applied, since the
foundation warranty of seaworthiness had been abrogated by statute.
The court was not right, however, as the Supreme Court in the Scindia
case in 1981 reaffirmed the Ryan warranty as one of the foundations
for the formulation of the shipowner's duty of care under the 1972
Amendments. 37
Had the warranty survived as a moral precept only? It had, after
all, been applied in various cases of damage or injury outside the field
of injury under the Longshoremen's Act in which it had been announced.
In addition to the implications of indemnity judgments to be mentioned
later, we have express authority that the warranty lives as a rule of
liability. In 1982, in a case where a barge sank because of improper
loading by a stevedore, the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the stevedore's warranty of workmanlike performance extended
not only to the barge owner and cargo owner, but also to the tug owner
and charterer." And in 1983 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
stated the matter very clearly:
The Ryan doctrine . . . included two facets: an implied under-
taking by a stevedore to render workmanlike performance and
the stevedore's duty to indemnify the owner for liability arising
out of its breach of duty. The first of these principles retains its
vitality. What Congress abandoned in the 1972 Amendments was
the notion that any breach of the stevedore's warranty of
workmanlike service requires him to indemnify the vessel for all
liability that breach might cause, regardless of the fault of the
vessel."
35. Id. at 187.
36. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacriema Operating Co. 355 U.S. 563, 98 S. Ct. 438 (1958).
37. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S. Ct. 1614
(1981).
38. Salter Marine, Inc. v. Conti Carriers & Terminals, 677 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1982).
39. Smith & Kelly Co. v. S.S. Concordia Tadj, 718 F.2d 1022, 102627 n.4 (lth Cir.
1983) (citations omitted); See also Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Northeast Petro. Indus.,
Inc., 706 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1983).
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There seems to be no reasonable basis for claiming that Congress did
anything to the warranty, except to prevent it from giving rise to damages
in the situation with which Congress was expressly concerned and perhaps
in a totally analogous situation where a longshoreman is employed by
the United States Government.' °
The warranty of workmanlike performance has become an endan-
gered species of snake which the courts do not want to kill but do not
like to handle. The obligation which it has always expressed is emmi-
nently sensible as a duty of some degree, but it is difficult to see why
it should ever have been a warranty. As a mere duty it does not owe
its origin to the warranty of seaworthiness, but it seems more than likely
that the warranty of seaworthiness has something to do with the Supreme
Court's having called this obligation a warranty in the Ryan case.
Apart from a few instances where public policy has intervened by
statute41 or otherwise 42 there is no reason why parties should not be
allowed to contract for full responsibility or, in other words, the as-
sumption of full risk involved in their common enterprise. When re-
sponsibility is not met or the risk materializes, full damages will follow.
But such an undertaking should not be raised up by implication. The
obligation of workmanlike performance should no doubt continue to
exist but without the peculiar designation as a warranty and possibly
not as a full risk agreement in the absence of an explicit undertaking
to that effect by the parties.
Contractual Indemnity
Of course it could scarcely be argued that the 1972 Amendments
had abolished all right whatever to contractual indemnity in injury cases.
But when tie case begins to approach longshoring or harbor work
analogous to it, questions begin to arise about both express and implied
contractual liabilities. They seem to arise especially in the Fifth Circuit
because of the number of cases there involving offshore operations where
there are likely to be numerous contractors. It now seems clear that
when the relationship between the injured man and the potential in-
demintor is not governed by the LHWCA or when the potential in-
demnitee is not a "vessel," there is no obstacle to indemnity.
When the employee of a drilling contractor was killed by the ex-
plosion of a water heater in the living quarters of a platform owned
by the oil company, the latter, when sued, was held entitled to recover
from the employer under an express indemnity clause notwithstanding
40. Compare Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1981) with Normile
v. Maritime Co. of the Phillipines, 643 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1981).
41. E.g., The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300 et seq. (1983).
42. E.g., Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 75 S. Ct. 629 (1955).
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that the employer's only direct liability was for compensation payments,
since the oil company and its platform could not be classified as a
vessel within the scope of the Act. 43 And where an employee of a sub-
subcontractor of Exxon had to sleep on an Exxon barge and was injured
there, Exxon was permitted to recover from its subcontractor under an
express indemnity clause. In the face of an argument based on the 1972
Amendments, the court said:
The relationship between Williams [the subcontractor] and Exxon
was not that contemplated by § 905(b). Exxon, unlike a con-
tractor (stevedore, repairmen, etc.) performing work for a ship
or vessel owner had not engaged to perform services giving rise
to the warranty of workmanlike performance (WWLP) on which
the action for indemnity ordinarily rests.
44
Not all of this law comes from the Fifth Circuit, however. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that a non-vessel is not
barred from recovery under an express indemnity agreement with a
stevedore or other employer even though the employer falls under the
Act. That Court has said:
[W]e would hesitate to hold that § 905(b) by its own force cuts
off the availability of Ryan indemnity to a non-vessel in all
cases where the concurring negligence of a stevedoring company
has caused injuries to the latter's employees, for example, al-
though we do not intend these to be exclusive, where there is
a direct contractual relationship between the third party and the
stevedores or where the third party is designated as a beneficiary
of an express contract between the stevedore and a vessel.
4
1
And in a case which involves no express indemnity clause and comes
much closer to the old Ryan type of case, a shipowner, held negligent
in not observing a defect of stowage at the time of loading which
resulted in the injury of a discharging was allowed to recover over
against a charterer whose charter made it responsible for loading and
stowing without any impediment on account of the current provisions
of the Act. 46 The same case, in dictum strongly used to fortify the
holding, said that the shipowner could also obtain indemnity from the
Japanese loading stevedore. The accuracy of this prediction is unknown
to the author.
None of the cases referred to depend expressly upon the implied
warranty of workmanlike performance. They show, however, the com-
43. Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 595 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1979).
44. Roberts v. Williams-McWilliams Co., 648 F.2d 255, 264 (5th Cir. 1981).
45. Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
46. Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981).
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plete lack of impediment to a contractual indemnity which does not
transgress the language of section 905(b) and its intent to protect the
employer from having to pay anything other than compensation benefits
for injury to his own employee. And if, as was previously stated, the
warranty of workmanlike performance is still alive and healthy, then
similarly there is no other or different impediment to its operation. No
doubt some lower court cases have reached inconsistent results, but they
do not seem to have support at the appellate level.
The 1984 Amendments to the Act added subsection (C) to section
5 of the LHWCA, 47 with an important qualification or exception to
the prohibition against contractual indemnity. It has long been extremely
common in the offshore oil industry for contracts among the oil company
operators, their contractors, and subcontractors to include "knock-for-
knock" agreements under which each party is required to take full
economic responsibility for all injuries and losses to its employees and
property without regard to fault. Many of these contracts and the services
involved do not fall. under the Act. In many instances, however, the
employments and services do fall under the Act or move in and out of
the Act's purview. The result has been legal and contractual confusion
in the administration of socially and contractually sensible arrangements
aimed at minimizing litigation. The new subsection seeks to remove any
impediment to the effectiveness of the "knock-for-knock" agreements
in cases falling under the Act by virtue of section 4 of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act.4
Tort Indemnity and the Burnside Doctrine
What we sometimes call "tort indemnity" generally depends upon
considerations of so-called primary or secondary liability or, more fre-
quently, on active and passive negligence. This kind of indemnity is well
described by Gorman as "restitution indemnity." '4 9 The Supreme Court
had put down considerations of primary and secondary liability or active
and passive negligence as having no place in the scheme of contractual
indemnity.5 0 Despite the qualification referring to contractual indemnity,
there have been those who wondered whether these considerations had
any place left at all in the maritime law. Later appellate decisions indicate
that they do.
47. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-426, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 1639 (1984) (to be codified
at 33 U.S.C. § 905(c)).
48. 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (1983).
49. Gorman, supra note 2, at 1171-72.
50. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 355 U.S. at 569, 78 S. Ct. at 442.
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The Fifth Circuit again has been the most fruitful source of cases
involving tort indemnity, in large part because of the many offshore
oil cases arising in that circuit dealing with disputes among the several
contractors involved. The Tri-State Oil Tool Industries case,5 decided
in 1969, is the leading case. Tri-State involved cross-claims between two
companies both under contract to an oil company but having no contract
between themselves. The Court of Appeals held that if the district court
should find that the one company which was held liable to its own
employee on the ground of unseaworthiness of its barge were only
passively negligent at most, it should recover indemnity from the other
which had been found unquestionably actively negligent. A number of
other cases involve the same principle, but it will suffice here to point
out that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals can be found analyzing
cases under the same rubric in 197852 and 1981.11 Unseaworthiness has,
without more, been definitely treated as passive negligence, 5 4 and it is
interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has treated
strict product liability in the same way and held that as between a
manufacturer liable on that basis and a shipowner liable for unsea-
worthiness, there can be no indemnity since the roles of both of them
are to be regarded as passive.5
In the First Circuit the doctrine has been recently recognized as one
involving "great disparity in the fault of the parties. ' '5 6 It is also still
recognized in the Fourth Circuit.5 7 In the Eighth Circuit it is applied
to property damage in terms which do not suggest that there would be
any other rule for personal injury. 8 As shall be shown below, however,
contribution is making inroads upon the doctrine of tort or restitution
indemnity.
The Burnside holding must be considered here. Under the Burnside
holding it appeared that a stevedore might at least plead to recover
indemnity for its compensation payments to an injured employee on the
basis that the shipowner had been negligent toward the stevedore in
51. Tri-State Oil Tool Indus., Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178 (5th
Cir. 1969).
52. Gele v. Chevron Oil Co., 574 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1978).
53. Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 644 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g en banc, 688 F.2d
280 (1982).
54. Kelloch v. S & H Subwater Salvage, Inc., 473 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1973).
55. Williams v. Brasea, Inc., 497 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1974).
56. Araujo v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard, Nantucket S.S Authority, 693 F.2d
1 (1st Cir. 1982).
57. See Wallenius Bremen G.m.b.H. v. United States, 409 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1969);
White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1981).
58. Pasco Marketing, Inc. v. Taylor Towing Serv., Inc., 554 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1977);
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Riverway Harbor Serv. St. Lewis, Inc., 639 F.2d
404 (8th Cir. 1981).
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being careless toward its longshoreman employee. 9 Burnside was decided
in 1969. In 1975 two courts of appeals, without having to decide the
matter, questioned whether the Burnside doctrine had survived the 1972
Amendments because of new language in 33 U.S.C. section 905(b) that
"[tihat remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other
remedies against the vessel except remedies available under this chap-
ter". 60 In 1975 also, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had
in dictum noted the Burnside doctrine as living law6' and in 1983 the
same court parlayed this dictum into a holding that the employer could
definitely maintain a direct action against the vessel owner. 62
The matter has probably been put to rest by another dictum, this
time from the Supreme Court in 1983 in the Pallas Shipping Agency
case. 63 That case concerned whether a longshoreman's claim had been
assigned to his employer by failure to bring suit within six months of
acceptance of compensation payments. In discussing this issue the Court
said: "[E]ven without a statutory assignment of the longshoreman's
claims, an employer can seek indemnification from negligent third parties
for payments it has made to the longshoreman." The Court then cited
the Burnside case and the Ninth Circuit holding. 64 While this statement
does not foreclose consideration of the matter by the Supreme Court
when it is actually presented, such dicta usually become holdings.
Insurance as a Substitute for Forbidden Indemnity
Contract requirements to obtain insurance for the benefit of the
other party or to name the other party as an additional insured have
long been familiar in maritime law and commerce. They are found in
charters, contracts of carriage, towing contracts and service contracts.
The abolition of Ryan indemnity in 1972 was accomplished by the
following language: "[Tihe employer shall not be liable to the vessel
for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties
to the contrary shall be void." '65
This prompts at least two questions. The first is whether the vessel
may validly contract with the stevedore to provide insurance for the
vessel covering longshoremen's injuries, and the second is whether, if
59. Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co. 394 U.S. 404, 89 S. Ct.
1144 (1969).
60. Landon v. Leif Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756 (2nd Cir. 1975); Celia v. Partenreederei
M.S. Ravenna, 529 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1975).
61. Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975).
62. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Barracuda Tanker Corp., 696 F.2d 703 (9th
Cir. 1983).
63. Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. Duris, 461 U.S. 529, 103 S. Ct. 1991 (1983).
64. Id. at 534, 103 S. Ct. at 1996.
65. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1983).
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the stevedore in fact does so, the insurance is valid and enforceable by
the vessel. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Price v. Zim Israel
Navigation Co. 66 has apparently answered both these questions in the
affirmative, but the answer to one of them may be illusory.
The case involved a contract between Zim, the shipowner, and its
stevedore in which Zim agreed to indemnify the stevedore against losses
resulting from the negligence of Zim or unseaworthiness of Zim's vessels,
and the stevedore agreed to have Zim named as a co-insured in its
insurance policies. In accordance with the latter provision the stevedore
obtained from its comprehensive general liability underwriters an en-
dorsement naming Zim. Price, a longshoreman employed by the steve-
dore, sued Zim. The underwriters refused to defend and, in a suit
brought by Zim against the underwriters, they contented that the en-
dorsement was void under the 1972 Amendments. The Court of Appeals
examined the legislative history and concluded that a purpose of the
statute was to "foreclose all theories under which Ryan triangle suits
might be brought rather than to prevent insurance arrangements such
as before us." 67
The court considered that one of Congress' main purposes was to
eliminate costly litigation and that nullifying the endorsement in this
case would not help meet that purpose. The court went on to observe
that the purpose of such a contract provision "may well be merely to
allocate initially the burden of procuring insurance" and that "[tihe
economic burden of the premiums can be allocated as the parties wish." 68
The author has found no other appellate decision on this point but has
found a district court case in which the judge expressly declines to follow
Price.69
While the Court of Appeals appeared to rationalize the insurance
requirement in the stevedore contract, one must keep in mind that the
action was not against the stevedore and we may wonder what the result
would have been if the insurance endorsement had not been obtained.
In an action against the stevedore for not obtaining the agreed en-
dorsement, the damages would have been the amount of the vessel's
liability to the longshoreman and a judgment against the stevedore would
66. 616 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 428.
68. Id. at 429.
69. Voison v. O.D.E.C.O. Drilling, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Tex. 1982). After
this article was submitted, however, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision,
following the 9th Circuit decision in Price and finding no congressional purpose to outlaw
additional assured clauses and holding the stevedore liable for failure to have the shipowner
named as an additional assured. Voison v. O.D.E.C.O. Drilling co., 744 F.2d 1174 (5th
Cir. 1984).
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appear to violate the statute directly. Would the court rationalize the
result by saying damages recovered were not "damages by reason" of
"the negligence of a vessel" in the language of the statute but were
damages by reason of a breach of contract? Such a rationale may be
difficult for some to accept, but, on the other side of the question, the
Court of Appeals has a good point that the insurance provision serves
well to eliminate third-party suits and that there is no policy to be
found within or without the Act against allowing the parties to bargain
as they wish over the insurance premiums. But one should consider that,
if the policy endorsement is not obtained by the stevedore and the
stevedore is then sued for breach, the third-party suit has not been
eliminated, as the Court of Appeals thought.
One is reminded, at any rate, of those cargo cases indicating that,
while a cargo owner may not be required to protect a common carrier
with insurance, the carrier may be able by contract to obtain the benefit
of insurance actually in force.70 It may well be resolved that where
insurance exists it may be enforced by the vessel and where it does not
the lack of it may not be made the basis of a claim against the employer.
The trend to contribution starts with the Cooper Stevedoring case7'
by which contribution was reinstated as the norm in cases of injury
jointly caused. That case and its ordinary application to areas unaffected
by the prohibition in the Act has already been discussed sufficiently.
As was also pointed out, by virtue of the Reliable Transfer case72
proportional fault is the rule of contribution. What is remarkable,
however, is the trend toward displacement of tort or restitution indemnity
by contribution and an indication that contribution may extend beyond
the tort field and be applied to breaches of contract.
In 1979, in a case where a longshoreman's injury was caused by
the combined negligence of the owner and the owner pro hac vice of
a vessel, and the latter sought indemnity from the former on the basis
of active and passive negligence,73 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
thought such indemnity would be strongly at odds with the preference
for comparative fault shown by the Supreme Court in the Reliable
Transfer case and therefore denied full indemnity and affirmed a pro-
portional award.
70. Cf. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & Western Transp. Co., 117 U.S. 312, 6 S. Ct.
750 (1886); Fluor Western, Inc. v. G.& H. Offshore Towing Co., 447 F.2d 35 (5th Cir.
1971); The Ferncliff, 22 F. Supp. 728 (D. Md. 1938), aff'd, 105 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir.
1939).
71. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 94 S. Ct. 2174
(1974).
72. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397, 95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975).
73. Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1979).
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In a case of a seaman's injury caused by the negligence of several
parties, the Firth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1982 considered that an
active/passive negligence indemnity judgment was inappropriate in light
of the Reliable Transfer case and remanded for apportionment of dam-
ages based on comparative fault. 74 In another seaman's case in 1983, '
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, reviewing an indemnity award, took
note of the Fifth Circuit indication that the active/passive rule had no
function in a comparative fault system, but did not have to decide the
question as they had found the conditions for the indemnity on that
basis had not been met in any event and reversed on that account.
A more startling result has been reached by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in another seaman's case in 1983.76 A seaman while
at sea fell through hatchboards which were found to be in an unsea-
worthy condition as a result of the stevedore's breach of the warranty
of workmanlike performance in closing up the hatch. The seaman ob-
tained a judgment against the stevedore, the stevedore sued the shipowner
for indemnity or contribution, and the shipowner counterclaimed for
indemnity. The shipowner won in the lower court, obtaining judgment
against the stevedore for attorneys' fees and expenses. The Court of
Appeals reviewed the background of Ryan indemnity extensively and
reaffirmed the vitality of the warranty of workmanlike performance but
drew a distinction between longshoremen and seamen, concluding that
the original justification for Ryan indemnity did not apply to contro-
versies involving seamen injured at sea. It therefore treated Ryan as a
very special case rather than an instance of the consequences of a breach
of contract. Having concluded that Ryan did not require a finding of
liability, the court perceived three approaches as follows:
[1] engage in an analysis, reminiscent of Ryan, to determine
whether as a general matter the shipowners or stevedores are
better able to take protective measures in cases such as this and
impose liability on that class in all cases; [2] engage in an analysis
• . . to determine whether in this case Smith & Kelly or the
vessel was best positioned to avoid the accident and impose
liability on that party; [3] apportion liability between the parties
by applying principles of comparative fault. 77
The court observed that the first two approaches were all-or-nothing
allocations and chose the third, on the grounds that it provided incentives
of care to both parties, was the fairest solution, and was consistent
.74. Loose v. Offshore Nay., Inc., 670 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1982).
75. Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Northeast Petro. Indus., Inc., 706 F.2d 349 (1st Cir.
1983).
76. Smith & Kelly Co. v. S/S Concordia Tadj, 718 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1983).
77. Id. at 1028 (footnotes omitted).
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with what it saw as "a wave of recent precedents [calling] for application
of comparative fault principles." 78
The case just described does not purport to make comparative fault
the rule in contracts. It is' rationalized in a very restrictive way. It is
also true that the stevedore's responsibility to defend its own employees
is different from that with respect to the seamen whom it does not
employ. That difference, however, does not underlie the warranty of
workmanlike performance but rather underlies the standards by which
workmanlike performance is measured. At any rate, contribution has
been applied to a breach of a duty arising from a contract between the
parties and it will be interesting to see if contribution further invades
the contract area.
It was stated earlier that the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
evidenced a strong trend toward the most equitable apportionment,
perhaps leading ultimately to a universal application of contribution and
apportionment. It seems that the accident which interupted that trend
can now easily be identified. The trend was interrupted by jurisprudence
created by the existence of the Act and the accident of Sieracki. With
Sieracki and some of its immediate consequences behind us, the law is
now free to resume the previous course, apart from restrictions imposed
by positive law as in the case of section 905(b).
The Effect of Settlement With A Joint Tortfeasor
A special contribution problem arises when one of the contributors
makes his contribution by way of settlement before the apportionment
of fault and the amount of damages have been determined. When degrees
of fault and amount of loss are ultimately settled, will the contributor
be forced or allowed to adjust his settlement contribution? The answer
in maritime law seems clearly and quite properly to be negative.
Generally,' there are two ways of charging against the plaintiff the
recovery he has made by settlement against one joint tortfeasor when
entering judgment against another. These are the pro tanto and pro rata
rules. Under the pro tanto rule, the court credits the defendant with
the actual amounts paid by any other defendants in settlement and the
non-settling defendant therefore pays the full damages less amounts
received from others. Under the pro rata rule, the non-settling defendant
pays that proportion of the total damages which corresponds to his
proportion of the fault and is therefore credited with other tortfeasors'
proper proportions regardless of the sums actually received from them
in settlement.
78. Id. at 1029.
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The leading case, Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc.," comes again
from the Fifth Circuit. Leger was an employee of Drilling Well Contro,
Inc. [DWC] and was injured while working on a barge owned by Dresser
in connection with an oil well owned by Continental. He settled with
everyone but Dresser, and evidently he made good settlements. At trial
the degrees of fault were found as follows: Dresser 45 percent, Continen-
tal 20 percent, DWC 0 percent, Leger 35 percent. Dresser contended for
the pro tanto rule, under which the large settlements already obtained
would leave Dresser liable for about $2,000. But the pro rata rule prevailed,
making Dresser liable for about $127,000 and giving Leger the benefit
of the bargains by which the others had bought his claims. The court
rejected Dresser's contention that pro rata reduction gave Leger a double
recovery and considered that the pro rata rule best balances the relative
risks of the parties. An important consideration behind the rule is that
it encourages settlements by making final settlement possible without the
risk of recourse by another party who has paid more than his proper
share would have been if all parties had been before the court.
In a short opinion the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has em-
braced the pro rata rule on the authority of the Leger case, denying
the non-settling defendant credit for a very large settlement exceeding
the total damages.8 0
This problem has not come to the appellate courts very often but
the pro rata rule of Leger has been uniformly applied in a number of
district court decisions. 8' In one of those cases, a plaintiff who ultimately
proved $233,000 in damages had settled for $40,000 with a party who
was held to have been 2/3 responsible, and he was held to his bargain,
recovering against the other defendant under the pro rata rule only one-
third of his damages. 8"
The proof of degrees of fault of parties, not all of whom are before
the court, raises some problems. One of these is illustrated in Ebanks
v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.83 The seamen, employed by Great
Lakes and working on its barge when it was struck by a tanker owned
by Chevron, settled with Chevron and brought suit against their em-
ployer, who filed a third-party action against Chevron, which was severed
for a separate trial. At the trial of the plaintiffs' claim against Great
79. 592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979).
80. Gormly v. Van Ingen, 736 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1983).
81. Fruge v. Damson Drilling Co., 423 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. La. 1976); Doyle v.
United States, 441 F. Supp. 701 (D.S.C. 1977); Kizer v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 489 F.
Supp. 835 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Tex. 1981).
82. Kizer, 489 F. Supp. at 835.
83. 688 F.2d 716 (lth Cir. 1982).
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Lakes, the jury was instructed to make findings as to the comparative
fault of Great Lakes and Chevron and found that while Great Lakes
was negligent, its negligence did not cause the injuries to the plaintiffs
and instead Chevron was 100 percent at fault. The seamen contended on
appeal that the trial court was wrong in asking the jury to determine
comparative fault as to a nonparty and the court of appeals agreed,
apparently on the basis of a rather worldly view of how juries function
as contrasted with their instructions. The court said:
[The jury's finding] is not so unusual when one considers that
the trial court gave the jury the opportunity to pin 100 percent
of the causation on Chevron, an obviously solvent participant
in the tragedy .. . [Tihe jury may well have thought it was
establishing 100 percent right of recovery in the plaintiffs against
Chevron, since, of course, they knew nothing of the settlement.
They, thus, may have paid little attention to the subsidiary
question whether Great Lakes' negligence contributed to the
injuries. 4
The Court of Appeals concluded that the comparative fault of the parties
should have been fought out in the third party suit between Great Lakes
and Chevron and distinguished the Leger case on the basis that the
"record seems to indicate that all parties were present and in court to
defend their own relative positions at the time the percentage issue was
being presented to the jury."8 " The Ebanks case was decided a year
before the same Court of Appeals wrapped its arms firmly around the
Leger decision. It does not seem that Ebanks can be reconciled with
Leger. Leger requires apportionment of the faults of settling and non-
settling parties. Ebanks would have that apportionment accomplished in
the severed third-party action between the settling and non-settling party,
but under Leger there would be no right to maintain that third-party
action, and it should therefore be dismissed.
It is hard to tell what, if any, will be the influence of this Eleventh
Circuit case in different circumstances, as when there is no alternative
suit pending for the determination of the percentage. Suffice it to say,
however, that the determination of relative percentages when all parties
are not present is fraught with problems and a great deal of care must
be taken with it.
The pro rata theory should prevail. It is in accord with the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, serves very practical policies as expounded in
Leger, and is in complete accord with the doctrinal foundation of
contribution in maritime law.
84. Id. at 718-19.
85. Id. at 720.
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CONCLUSION
Contract indemnity is alive and vigorous in the field of maritime
injury except in those narrow circumstances in which it is forbidden.
But, while doctors of the highest authority have pronounced the warranty
of workmanlike performance to be alive and well, it appears to be ailing
and suffers from conflicting diagnoses. As a consequence, contract in-
demnity based on it appears to have a somewhat unsteady existence.
Tort or restitution indemnity based upon primary and secondary liability
or active and passive negligence is also alive but may not live very long.
The spirit of contribution is in full vigor, and it makes itself felt
everywhere, usually at the expense of indemnity. When in doubt, bet
on contribution and proportional liability to survive.
